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INTRODUCTION 
 
The question presented is …   
 … whether Indian tribes’ inherent sovereignty includes the ability, endorsed by 
Congress, to punish criminals who terrorize Indian victims through domestic 
violence or dating violence. 
… whether non-Indian defendants should receive the full panoply of federal 
constitutional rights when being prosecuted in tribal courts for crimes of domestic 
violence or dating violence. 
 
These twin “questions presented” are on the table as the nation waits to 
see whether courts will uphold the provisions in the Violence Against 
Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA 2013) that give Indian tribes 
“special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction” over non-Indian 
defendants.1 Given the current tribal–federal framework,2 answering “yes” 
 
1 See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, §§ 904, 908, 
127 Stat. 54, 120-23, 125-26 (Mar. 7, 2013) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304 & note on effective dates 
and pilot project (Supp. 2013)) (authorizing “[t]ribal jurisdiction over crimes of domestic 
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to both questions presented is impossible. One of the two interests—
inherent tribal sovereignty or non-Indian defendants’ full federal 
constitutional rights—must be compromised. 
Special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction for Indian tribes took 
effect nationally on March 7, 2015,3 and it was a historic moment for the 
tribes. Ever since the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, tribes had been powerless to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants. 4  Because the Court held that 
“Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and punish non-
Indians,”5 an unfortunate gap in enforcement resulted: for crimes committed 
in Indian country, where states’ criminal jurisdiction is limited6 and where 
 
violence,” as well as “pilot projects” for tribes that showed readiness to implement such 
jurisdiction “on an accelerated basis”); see also Tom Gede, Criminal Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes: 
Should Non-Indians Be Subject to Tribal Criminal Authority Under VAWA?, ENGAGE: J. 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS, July 2012, at 40, 44 (opining that special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction brings “significant constitutional and prudential questions that will 
likely have to be tested at the highest levels”). 
2 See infra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
3  Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 § 908(b)(1), 127 Stat. at 125 
(declaring that special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, as described in section 904 of 
VAWA 2013, will take effect [n]ot later than“2 years after the date of enactment”). 
4 See 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978) (“By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United 
States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the 
United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress.”). 
5 Id. at 212. 
6 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (holding that state law “can have 
no force” within Indian country); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
§ 6.01[2] (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) (explaining how the Worcester holding has endured for 
state criminal jurisdiction over Indians, even as Indian country has become more integrated with 
non-Indian lands).  
States do, however, retain criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants in Indian country. 
See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881) (holding that a state could exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians “throughout the whole of the territory within its limits,” 
which extends to any Indian reservations therein); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW, supra, § 6.01[3] (explaining that, though the McBratney decision is “far from clear,” its rule 
“remains valid as precedent”); id. § 9.03[1] (noting that McBratney is “settled precedent” and is 
consistently followed in state criminal prosecutions of non-Indians for offenses against non-Indian 
victims). 
Certain states also have statutory criminal jurisdiction over Indian defendants under Public 
Law 280. As originally enacted, Public Law 280 gave Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
Oregon, and Wisconsin criminal jurisdiction within Indian country, though these states may now 
“retrocede” this grant of jurisdiction back to the federal government. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) 
(2012); Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, sec. 2, § 1162(a), 67 Stat. 588, 588 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012)); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2012) (authorizing retrocession). 
The Public Law 280 framework was amended in 1968 to give other states the option to assume 
Public Law 280 jurisdiction over Indian defendants in Indian country, if these added states 
obtained tribal consent. See Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 401(a), 82 Stat. 73, 78 
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the federal government lacks the resources to prosecute crimes effectively,7 
non-Indian offenders regularly escaped prosecution.8 This problem was 
particularly disturbing in the context of domestic violence and related 
crimes. For example, sixty-seven percent of the sexual abuse and related 
offenses committed in Indian country and charged in fiscal years 2005–2009 
were left unprosecuted by the federal government.9  
 
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (2012)); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW, supra, § 6.04[3][a] (discussing Public Law 280 and its subsequent history). 
Despite McBratney and Public Law 280, states by and large cannot or do not prosecute non-
Indians for offenses committed against Indian victims—and domestic violence crimes committed 
by non-Indians on Indian victims make up the majority of domestic violence crimes in Indian 
country. See sources cited infra note 8. 
7 See S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 9 (2012) (noting that federal law enforcement authorities are 
sometimes “hours away and are often without the tools or resources needed to appropriately 
respond to domestic violence crimes while also addressing large-scale drug trafficking, organized 
crime, and terrorism cases”); Ryan D. Dreveskracht, House Republicans Add Insult to Native 
Women’s Injury, 3 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 1, 15 (2013) (illustrating how federal 
prosecution of sexual assaults on some remote reservations is impossible, “given the short 
timeframes for properly using a ‘rape kit’”); Shefali Singh, Note, Closing the Gap of Justice: 
Providing Protection for Native American Women Through the Special Domestic Violence Criminal 
Jurisdiction Provision of VAWA, 28 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 210 (2014) (reporting how, 
because of limited resources, the federal government regularly declines to prosecute crimes of 
violence that occur in Indian country). 
8 See generally Singh, supra note 7, at 209-10 (describing the jurisdictional gap in enforcement). 
Non-Indian offenders commit most of the domestic violence offenses committed against Indian 
victims. S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 9 (2012); see also AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE 
FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 4 
(2007), http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/MazeOfInjustice.pdf [http://perma.cc/5HYF-GXH8] 
(“According to the US Department of Justice, in at least 86 per cent of reported cases of rape or 
sexual assault against American Indian and Alaska Native women, survivors report that the 
perpetrators are non-Native men.”); STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 203097, 
AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992-2002, at v (2004), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/aic02.pdf [http://perma.cc/9NC2-5EPR] (“Approximately 
60% of American Indian victims of violence . . . described the offender as white.”); Dreveskracht, 
supra note 7, at 14 (“Non-Indians commit over eighty percent of the rapes and sexual assaults 
against Indian women.”); Troy A. Eid, Making Native America Safer and More Just for All 
Americans, 40 A.B.A. HUM. RTS., no. 4, 2014, at 7, 9 (“[N]on-Native men commit a 
disproportionate number of domestic violence acts against Native women.”). 
Due to insufficient law enforcement funding, infrequent prosecution of non-Indian defendants 
remained the norm even in states that had criminal jurisdiction over Indian country under Public 
Law 280. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra, at 29, (noting that in Public Law 280 states, “tribal and 
state authorities have not received sufficient funds to assume their respective law enforcement 
responsibilities”); Singh, supra note 7, at 209-10 (“Lack of funding and numerous other factors 
have contributed to the reality that state and local law enforcement agencies in Indian country 
acting under P.L. 280 criminal jurisdiction have generally provided unsatisfactory service and 
ineffective crime control.”).  
9  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-167R, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE DECLINATIONS OF INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL MATTERS 9 (2010), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11167r.pdf [http://perma.cc/JB9N-XXMN]. 
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Enter VAWA 2013 and special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction 
for Indian tribes. Recognizing that “much of the violence against Indian 
women is perpetrated by non-Indian men” who “regularly go unpunished,” 
Congress intended special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction to fill the 
prosecutorial enforcement gap for domestic violence offenses.10 Codified at 
13 U.S.C. § 1304, the new provisions recognize tribes’ “inherent power . . . 
to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all 
persons”11—including non-Indians. 
Although tribes and their advocates have celebrated VAWA 2013’s 
partial override of the Oliphant decision,12 special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction has yet to withstand constitutional scrutiny at the Supreme 
Court. In the debates before VAWA 2013’s passage, tribal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians sparked controversy because legislators and commentators 
understood that non-Indian defendants prosecuted and tried in tribal court 
would not receive the full protection of the federal Constitution.13 This 
 
10 S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 9. The legislation came after years of advocacy from tribes, 
domestic violence survivors, and their allies. Tribal voices used- many means, including the arts, 
to call attention to the pervasive problems in Indian country. For instance, a play titled Sliver of a 
Full Moon narrates the stories of Indian domestic violence survivors and their fight to obtain the 
VAWA 2013 provisions that created special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction. See SLIVER  
OF A FULL MOON, http://www.sliverofafullmoon.org, [http://perma.cc/C7ZX-WDG6] (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2015). 
11 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1) (Supp. 2013). 
12 See, e.g., Lorelai Laird, Indian Tribes Are Retaking Jurisdiction over Domestic Violence on Their 
Own Land, ABA J. (Apr. 1, 2015, 6:02 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/ article/ 
indian_tribes_are_retaking_jurisdiction_over_domestic_violence_on_their_own [perma.cc/DS5N-
LTKJ] (“[M]any Indian legal observers see Section 904 [the special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction provisions] as a major step toward safer reservations and, perhaps, full tribal criminal 
jurisdiction.”). 
13 See S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 48-49 (Minority Views from Sens. Kyl, Hatch, Sessions, and 
Coburn) (arguing against tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians because non-Indians “would enjoy 
few meaningful civil-rights protections” and “the absence of separation of powers and an 
independent judiciary in most tribal governments makes them an unsuitable vehicle for ensuring 
the protection of civil rights”); Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & Joseph Lupino-Esposito, The Violence Against 
Women Act, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, and Indian Tribal Courts, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 8-9, 17-39 
(2012) (arguing that tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants would raise questions under 
Articles II and III of the federal Constitution); Jennifer Bendery, Chuck Grassley on VAWA: Tribal 
Provision Means ‘The Non-Indian Doesn’t Get a Fair Trial,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 21, 2013, 5:33 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/21/chuck-grassley-vawa_n_2735080.html [http:// 
perma.cc/5GWS-F3Y3] (commenting on remarks made by Senator Chuck Grassley, who expressed 
concern that allowing tribal court juries to try non-Indians may violate non-Indians’ federal 
constitutional rights to a jury trial and to the equal protection of the law); see also Laird, supra note 12 
(reporting on the controversy surrounding special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction and VAWA 
2013’s passage). But see Letter from Kevin Washburn, Dean and Professor of Law, University of New 
Mexico School of Law, et al. to Sen. Patrick Leahy et al., Constitutionality of Tribal Government 
Provisions in VAWA Reauthorization (Apr. 21, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/vawa-
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constitutional question—whether the Constitution applies in full force in 
prosecutions brought under special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction—turns on whether the expanded tribal jurisdiction is an 
exercise of “inherent” tribal sovereignty or delegated federal authority. If 
the new jurisdiction is an exercise of inherent tribal sovereignty, then tribes 
are not obligated to provide non-Indian defendants with the full protection 
of the federal Constitution. But if the new jurisdiction is delegated federal 
authority, then non-Indian defendants would be entitled to the full panoply 
of rights under the federal Constitution—including, potentially, the right to 
an Article III judge appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate under Article II of the Constitution. The bounds of inherent tribal 
sovereignty could thus determine whether special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction lives or dies.14 
This Comment begins in Part I by outlining the history of tribal 
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, with a focus on the law most 
relevant to analyzing the bounds of tribes’ inherent sovereignty to 
adjudicate crimes over non-Indians. Part II explains VAWA 2013’s special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction in more detail and summarizes how 
it has been implemented since the statute’s enactment. Part III discusses the 
arguments for and against finding that tribes have inherent tribal 
sovereignty to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, and 
why the outcome matters for both tribes and non-Indian defendants. Part 
 
letter-from-law-professors-tribal-provisions.pdf [http://perma.cc/9ZTS-2W5P] (arguing for special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction’s passage and defending its constitutionality). 
Special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction in Alaska was particularly contentious—so 
much so that VAWA 2013 included a statutory exemption for the state of Alaska. See Violence 
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113-4, § 910, 127 Stat. 54, 126 (Mar. 7, 2013) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2265 note (Supp. 2013)) (“In the State of Alaska, the amendments made 
by sections 904 and 905 shall only apply to the Indian country . . . of the Metlakatla Indian 
Community, Annette Island Reserve.”). Tremendous disfavor toward the “Alaska exemption” 
prompted its repeal in December 2014. See Act of Dec. 18, 2014, Pub. L. 113-275, 128 Stat. 2988, 
2988 (repealing section 910 of VAWA 2013); Troy A. Eid & Affie Ellis, Indian Law and Order 
Commission Proposals Gain Ground, FED. LAW., June 2015, at 17, 17-18 (discussing the reforms that 
made federal officials more accountable to Alaska Indian communities); Sari Horwitz, Senator Tries to 
Repeal Divisive Provision She Inserted in Violence Against Women Act, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/senator-tries-to-repeal-divisive-provision-
she-inserted-in-violence-against-women-act/2014/08/02/c918f854-05ef-11e4-8a6a-19355c7e870a_story 
.html [http://perma.cc/3S79-KT7P] (reporting on the desperate need for greater tribal law 
enforcement in Alaska, which spurred the repeal of the Alaska exemption). 
14 See infra Section III.A for a more detailed discussion of this analysis. Part IV takes up a 
similar but related issue—the bounds of congressional power to legislate inherent tribal sovereignty 
that denies non-Indian defendants federal constitutional rights. Both analytical routes could 
support or dismantle special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction as envisioned by Congress. 
See infra Part V. 
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IV takes an aside to note the lurking influence of the congressional plenary 
power doctrine, which gives Congress broad authority to legislate in the 
realm of Indian affairs. And Part V outlines how courts’ ultimate rulings 
(and their underlying reasoning) would affect special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction’s future. The Conclusion addresses the underlying 
questions: What are the bounds of tribes’ inherent sovereignty? From what 
does that sovereignty derive? The answer will affect not just special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction under VAWA 2013, but also possible 
future expansions of tribal criminal jurisdiction by Congress. 
I. TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
A. Historical Origins 
When analyzing the bounds of inherent tribal sovereignty, the Supreme 
Court often begins by looking to the earliest records of tribal–federal 
relations. 15  The earliest federal treaties with Indian tribes do address 
whether tribes could prosecute and punish non-Indian criminal offenders—
but without clearly answering whether, absent a treaty, a tribe’s inherent 
sovereign authority would have included these powers. 
The first ratified treaty between the United States and an Indian tribe 
was the 1778 Treaty with the Delawares.16 The treaty forbade both the 
United States and the tribe from inflicting “punishments on the citizens of 
the other” until “a fair and impartial trial” was held before judges or juries 
of both the United States and the tribe.17 Under the treaty, therefore, the 
Delawares lacked the independent jurisdiction to prosecute and punish non-
Indians who were citizens of the United States.  
Later treaties went further and declined to give tribes any power to 
prosecute or punish United States citizens who “commit[ted] a robbery or 
 
15 See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688-92 (1990) (examining historical sources and how 
they bear on whether tribes may prosecute nonmember Indian defendants), superseded by statute, 
Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, sec. 8077(b)–(c), § 201(2), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), (4) (2012)), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 
(2004); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 192-93, 195-206 (1978) (same, for non-
Indian defendants). 
16 Treaty with the Delawares, U.S.–Del., Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13; see Robert N. Clinton, 
There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 118 (2002) 
(identifying the Treaty with the Delawares as “the nation’s first ratified treaty with an Indian 
tribe”). 
17 Treaty with the Delawares, supra note 16, art. IV, 7 Stat. at 14. 
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murder, or other capital crime, on any Indian.” 18 Instead, the treaties 
allowed punishment and prosecution of non-Indians under only federal law 
and using only federal procedure, to the exclusion of any tribal justice 
system.19 And these later treaties did not even permit the tribes to prosecute 
and punish Indian offenders who committed crimes against United States 
citizens; rather, the treaties obliged the tribes to extradite Indian offenders 
to the United States for punishment by a federal tribunal.20 
But these treaty provisions do not necessarily stand for the notion that, 
historically, tribes’ inherent sovereignty did not include the power to 
prosecute and punish non-Indians. One could interpret the treaties as either 
(1) codifying then-current understanding of inherent tribal sovereignty, or 
(2) restricting aspects of the then-current understanding of the tribe’s 
inherent sovereignty.21 In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Supreme 
Court took the first view: “From the earliest treaties with these tribes, it 
was apparently assumed that the tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction 
 
18 Treaty with the Chickasaws, U.S.–Chickasaw Nation, Jan. 10, 1786, art. VI, 7 Stat. 24, 25; 
Treaty with the Choctaws, U.S.–Choctaw Nation, Jan. 3, 1786, art. VI, 7 Stat. 21, 22; Treaty with 
the Cherokees, U.S.–Cherokees, Nov. 28, 1785, art. VII, 7 Stat. 18, 19. 
19 See, e.g., Treaty with the Creeks, U.S.–Creek Nation, Aug. 7, 1790, art. IX, 7 Stat. 35, 37; 
Treaty with the Indian Nations in the Northern Department and with the Wiandot, Delaware, 
Ottawa, Chippewa, Pattawatima and Sac Nations, Jan. 9, 1789, art. V, 7 Stat. 28, 29 [hereinafter 
Treaty with the Indian Nations]; id. at “Separate Article,” 7 Stat. 32; Treaty with the Shawnees, 
U.S.–Shawanoe Nation, Jan. 31, 1786, art. III, 7 Stat. 26, 26; Treaty with the Chickasaws, supra 
note 18, art. VI, 7 Stat. at 25; Treaty with the Choctaws, supra note 18, art. VI, 7 Stat. at 22; Treaty 
with the Cherokees, supra note 18, art. VII, 7 Stat. at 19. One treaty also contemplated exclusive 
federal civil jurisdiction over Indians pressing claims against United States citizens for stolen 
horses. Treaty with the Indian Nations, supra, art. VI, 7 Stat. at 29-30; id. at “Separate Article,” 7 
Stat. at 32. 
20 Treaty with the Creeks, supra note 19, art. VIII, 7 Stat. at 37; Treaty with the Indian 
Nations, supra note 19, art. V, 7 Stat. at 29; id. at “Separate Article,” 7 Stat. at 32; Treaty with the 
Shawnees, supra note 19, art. III, 7 Stat. at 26; Treaty with the Chickasaws, supra note 18, art. V, 7 
Stat. at 25; Treaty with the Choctaws, supra note 18, art. V, 7 Stat. at 22; Treaty with the 
Cherokees, supra note 18, art. VI, 7 Stat. at 19; Treaty with the Wiandot, Delaware, Chippawa, and 
Ottawa Nations, Jan. 21, 1785, art. IX, 7 Stat. 16, 17. 
21 In the public international law context, commentators have disagreed over whether a treaty 
(1) can merely codify preexisting rules governing relations between different sovereigns or 
(2) must inevitably change those rules even as it attempts only to write them down. Compare 
GIDEON BOAS, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY PRINCIPLES AND 
PERSPECTIVES 72 (2012) (“Besides crystallizing a custom and influencing subsequent 
crystallization, a treaty may ‘codify’ pre-existing custom, giving it a definite wording.”), with R.Y. 
Jennings, The Progressive Development of International Law and its Codification, 24 BRITISH Y.B. 
INT’L L. 301, 304-05 (1947) (noting that “so-called declaratory treaties,” which purport to codify 
existing customary international law, are in tension with the axiom that a treaty binds only those 
states that are parties to it, because third-party states are bound by customary international law 
even if this law is given written expression in a treaty to which these states are not party). 
However, situating the interpretation of federal–tribal treaties within this debate exceeds the 
scope of this Comment. 
  
2015] Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction for Indian Tribes 251 
 
over non-Indians absent a congressional statute or treaty provision to that 
effect.”22 The second view, however, is equally plausible. Professor Robert 
Clinton has criticized the Oliphant view for being “revisionist”23—a charge 
that gains support from some other early treaty provisions, which dealt with 
non-Indian settlers on tribal lands. 
Seven of the eight earliest recorded treaties included language 
disclaiming federal protection over non-Indian settlers on tribal lands.24 Six 
of those seven treaties further declared that the tribes could punish those 
non-Indian violators as they wished.25 In contrast to the treaty provisions 
about common law crimes, these land-related provisions did contemplate 
tribal jurisdiction to punish non-Indians. Although Oliphant dismisses these 
provisions as simply “a means of discouraging non-Indian settlements on 
Indian territory,”26 they could equally be viewed as recognizing tribes’ 
inherent sovereign authority to punish all unwelcome trespassers on their 
lands.27 As Professor Clinton has commented, Oliphant appears to swat away 
the land-related treaty provisions to achieve the result the Court wanted: a 
historical narrative that denied inherent tribal authority to prosecute and 
punish non-Indians.28 
All in all, the early treaties are inconclusive data. Advocates and judges 
can use them both to support and to deny the notion that early conceptions 
of inherent tribal sovereignty included tribal authority to prosecute and 
punish non-Indians. Someone looking to early treaties to reveal the bounds 
of “ancient inherent tribal power”29 will be disappointed. 
 
22 435 U.S. 191, 197 (1978); see also id. at 197-99 n.8 (concluding that the early treaties and 
their provisions “were not necessary to remove criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians from the 
Indian tribes,” but rather “clarif[ied] jurisdictional limits of the Indian tribes”). 
23 Clinton, supra note 16, at 215. 
24 Treaty with the Creeks, supra note 19, art. VI, 7 Stat. at 36; Treaty with the Indian Nations, 
supra note 19, art. V, 7 Stat. at 30; Treaty with the Shawnees, supra note 19, art. VII, 7 Stat. at 27; 
Treaty with the Chickasaws, supra note 18, art. IV, 7 Stat. at 25; Treaty with the Choctaws, supra 
note 18, art. IV, 7 Stat. at 22; Treaty with the Cherokees, supra note 18, art. V, 7 Stat. at 19; Treaty 
with the Wiandot, Delaware, Chippawa, and Ottawa Nations, supra note 20, art. V, 7 Stat. at 17. 
25 Treaty with the Creeks, supra note 19, art. VI, 7 Stat. at 6; Treaty with the Indian Nations, 
supra note 19, art. IX, 7 Stat. at 30; Treaty with the Chickasaws, supra note 18, art. IV, 7 Stat. at 25; 
Treaty with the Choctaws, supra note 18, art. IV, 7 Stat. at 22; Treaty with the Cherokees, supra 
note 18, art. V, 7 Stat. at 19; Treaty with the Wiandot, Delaware, Chippawa, and Ottawa Nations, 
supra note 20, art. V, 7 Stat. at 17. 
26 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 198 n.8. 
27 See Clinton, supra note 16, at 122 (emphasizing how the early treaties recognized the 
“complete territorial sovereignty of Indian tribes” over tribal lands). 
28 See id. at 214 (“[T]o solidify its historical point, the Court was forced to marginalize early 
treaties that expressly provided that Indian tribes could punish illegal white settlers.”). 
29 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 211 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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B. Oliphant: No Jurisdiction over Non-Indians 
In 1978, the Supreme Court decisively answered the question of whether 
tribes have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants. And the 
answer was “no.”  
The Supreme Court case Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe grew out of 
the Suquamish tribe’s prosecutions of two non-Indian residents of the Port 
Madison Reservation.30 One was charged with assaulting a tribal officer and 
resisting arrest; the other, with “recklessly endangering another person” and 
injuring tribal property after an alleged high-speed race on reservation 
highways.31 The two defendants sought habeas relief and argued that the 
tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians such as themselves.32 
Although the lower courts rejected their arguments, the Supreme Court 
ruled for the non-Indian defendants and held that the tribe did indeed lack 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.33 
The Court’s opinion began by looking to historical precedents, which it 
concluded did not support tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.34 It 
next gave “considerable weight” to “the commonly shared presumption of 
Congress, the Executive Branch, and lower federal courts that tribal courts 
do not have the power to try non-Indians.”35 But the core of the Court’s 
reasoning flowed from its view of tribes’ powers as “constrained” by 
“incorporation into the territory of the United States . . . so as not to 
conflict with the . . . overriding sovereignty” of the federal government.36 
The tribes’ subordinate status meant not only limitations on land transfers 
and foreign relations powers, but also limitations on “their power to try 
non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to 
Congress.”37 Despite recognizing tribal courts’ increased sophistication, the 
procedural rights guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 
(ICRA), and the prevalence of non-Indian crime on reservations, the Court 
maintained that the tribes lacked inherent jurisdiction to try and punish 
 
30 435 U.S. at 194. Although under an 1855 treaty the Suquamish were Port Madison 
Reservation’s designated occupants, by the 1970s only thirty-seven percent of the reservation was 
Indian-owned and only fifty tribe members lived on the reservation. Id. at 192-93 & 192 n.1. 
31 Id. at 194. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 194-95. 
34 Id. at 195-206; see also supra Section I.A (discussing the Court’s one-sided interpretation of 
early treaties). 
35 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206. 
36 Id. at 209. 
37 Id. at 209-10. 
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non-Indians.38 The countervailing considerations were waved aside: they 
were matters for Congress, not the Court, to weigh.39 
C. Duro, the Duro Fix, and Lara: Jurisdiction over Nonmember Indians 
Until VAWA 2013’s special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, 
Oliphant was the rule for tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. But 
on the issue of tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, the last 
three decades saw a significant dialogue between Congress and the Court—
a dialogue that may preface the coming debate over the extent to which 
Oliphant endures, post–VAWA 2013. 
In May 1990, the Supreme Court held in Duro v. Reina that tribes lacked 
criminal jurisdiction over Indians who were not members of the respective 
prosecuting tribes. 40  Because the historical argument for denying 
jurisdiction was weaker here than in Oliphant, 41  the Court rested its 
conclusion in large part on the principle that a tribe’s authority should 
derive “from the consent of its members.”42 Given that tribal courts did not 
provide nonmember defendants with the full guarantees of the federal 
Constitution, the Court held that a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction over its 
members was justified by “the voluntary character of tribal membership,” but 
that the tribes’ criminal jurisdiction could not extend to nonmembers, who by 
definition had not given voluntary consent.43 As the Court had done in 
Oliphant, the Duro Court emphasized that Congress—not the Court—
should solve insufficient criminal-law enforcement problems on Indian 
lands.44 
Congress’s response was swift. In November of that same year, 
Congress passed legislation that overruled Duro’s holding and granted tribes 
criminal jurisdiction to prosecute nonmember Indians.45 The key statutory 
change was a new provision that defined “Indian” for purposes of tribal 
 
38 Id. at 211-12. 
39 Id. at 212. 
40 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-511, sec. 8077(b)–(c), § 201(2), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), (4) 
(2012)), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
41 See id. at 688-91 (noting that “[t]he historical record in this case is somewhat less 
illuminating than in Oliphant” and that “[e]vidence on criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers is 
less clear,” but nonetheless concluding that the evidence “on balance supports the view that 
inherent tribal jurisdiction extends to tribe members only”). 
42 Id. at 693. 
43 Id. at 693-94. 
44 Id. at 698. 
45 See Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, sec. 8077(b)–(c), § 201(2), 104 Stat. 1856, 
1892-93 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), (4) (2012)). 
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criminal jurisdiction as “any person” who would be subject to federal 
criminal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153.46 
Under United States v. Rogers, this definition of “Indian” includes persons 
with (1) some Indian blood, who are (2) associated with a federally 
recognized tribe—but it contains no restriction on the specific tribe with 
which an Indian is associated.47 The new statute therefore extended tribal 
criminal jurisdiction to all “Indians”—including nonmember Indians. 
Congress also clearly stated that tribal criminal jurisdiction over 
nonmember Indians flowed from “the inherent power of Indian tribes, 
hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all 
Indians.”48 This inherent-power provision communicated Congress’s direct 
disagreement with the Supreme Court’s view that inherent tribal authority 
did not include the power to punish nonmembers in tribal court.49 
When Congress’s “Duro fix”50 came to the Supreme Court for review in 
2004, the Court upheld it in the face of a double jeopardy challenge brought 
by a nonmember Indian.51 In United States v. Lara, the Court declared that 
“Congress has the constitutional power to relax restrictions that the political 
branches have, over time, placed on the exercise of a tribe’s inherent legal 
authority.”52  
The Court did not just affirm Congress’s ability to enact the Duro fix; it 
also overruled Duro by endorsing the notion that tribal criminal jurisdiction 
over nonmember Indians flowed from tribes’ inherent sovereignty.53 The 
Court’s inherent-sovereignty justification was key to defeating the defendant’s 
double jeopardy claim: his claim depended on his initial tribal prosecution 
being an exercise of delegated federal authority, so that his subsequent 
 
46 Id. sec. 8077(c), § 201(4), 104 Stat. at 1892-93 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(4) (2012)). 
47 United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572-73 (1846) (holding that, for federal 
criminal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act, a man without Indian blood who was adopted 
into a tribe “is not an Indian” and thus could not receive the exception from federal criminal 
jurisdiction for Indian-on-Indian crimes); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 
supra note 6, § 3.03[4] (“The common test that has evolved after United States v. Rogers, for use 
with both of the federal Indian country criminal statutes, considers Indian descent, as well as 
recognition as an Indian by a federally recognized tribe.”). 
48 Act of Nov. 5, 1990, sec. 8077(b), § 201(2), 104 Stat. at 1892 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1301(2) (2012)). 
49 Cf. Duro, 495 U.S. at 694 (“[N]o delegation of authority to a tribe has to date included the 
power to punish nonmembers in tribal court. We decline to produce such a result through 
recognition of inherent tribal authority.”). 
50 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 216 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(using the term). 
51 Id. at 196-99 (majority opinion). See gemerally U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any 
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”). 
52 Id. at 196. 
53 Id. at 199. 
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federal prosecution would be an impermissible second prosecution brought 
under federal auspices.54 But because the tribal prosecution was an exercise 
of inherent tribal authority rather than of federal power, and because the 
Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause “does not bar successive prosecutions 
by separate sovereigns,” the Court rejected the defendant’s double jeopardy 
claim.55 
The Duro–Duro fix–Lara dialogue between Congress and the Court was 
about tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. For tribal 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, we have the two first steps of an 
analogous dialogue: Oliphant,56 followed by VAWA 2013’s special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction.57 What is left—and what tribal observers are 
waiting for58—is the final step. Will the Supreme Court mimic its approach 
in Lara if special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction comes before the 
Court for review? 
  
 
54 Id. at 196-99. 
55 Id. at 197, 210. The Court also rejected the defendant’s due process claim on similar 
grounds. Id. at 207-09. 
56 See generally supra Section I.B. 
57 See generally supra notes 3–14 and accompanying text. Part II, infra, discusses in more detail 
how VAWA 2013 partially overrides Oliphant. 
58 See Laird, supra note 12 (noting how tribes are “very aware” of a possible legal challenge 
and have even encouraged defendants to appeal in hope that a tribe-friendly vehicle will reach the 
Court for review). 
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Table 1: Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction 
 
 Over Nonmember 
Indians 
Over Non-Indians 
Initial Supreme Court 
Ruling 
 
Tribes lack 
jurisdiction, because 
they lack nonmember 
Indians’ voluntary 
consent. 
–Duro, 199059
 
Tribes lack 
jurisdiction, because 
the federal 
government’s 
overriding sovereignty 
constrains them. 
–Oliphant, 197860 
Congressional Reply 
 
Tribes have 
jurisdiction because of 
their inherent power. 
–Duro fix, 199061
 
Tribes have 
jurisdiction because of 
their inherent power. 
–VAWA 201362 
Supreme Court  
Response:  
Ruling on the 
Constitutionality of the 
Congressional Reply 
Tribes’ jurisdiction is 
constitutional because 
of tribes’ inherent 
sovereignty.  
–Lara, 200363 
To be determined 
 
II. SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION UNDER 
VAWA 2013 
A. Narrowly Expanded Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-Indian 
Defendants 
Before examining how and why the Supreme Court might rule,64 it is 
worth examining the nuanced choices Congress made when enacting special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction. While the Duro fix was a general 
override of the Supreme Court’s holding in Duro, special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction overrides Oliphant only partially: It applies only to 
 
59 See generally supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text. 
60 See generally supra Section I.B. 
61 See generally supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text. 
62 See generally supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
63 See generally supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
64 See infra Parts III–IV. 
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certain acts involving certain people committed on certain territory. And it 
also applies only when accompanied by appropriate safeguards to protect 
defendants’ rights. 
VAWA 2013 defines special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction as 
“criminal jurisdiction that a participating tribe may exercise under [VAWA 
2013] but could not otherwise exercise.”65 A participating tribe is “an Indian 
tribe that elects to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction 
over the Indian country of that tribe.”66 Under the statute, “Indian country” 
has the same definition as the one used for the Major Crimes Act in 18 
U.S.C. § 1153, and it covers reservation land, dependent Indian 
communities, and Indian allotments. 67  Thus, special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction is territorially limited. 
The statute also limits special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction 
based on defendants’ and victims’ personal attributes. Either the defendant 
or the victim must be Indian; 68  special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction is not allowed if neither is Indian.69 A victim may be Indian or 
non-Indian, so long as he or she is “specifically protected by a protection 
order that the defendant allegedly violated.”70 As for the defendant, he or 
she must have ties to the prosecuting Indian tribe: the defendant must 
(1) reside in the tribe’s Indian country, (2) be employed in the tribe’s 
Indian country, or (3) be the spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner of a 
member of the tribe or an Indian who resides in the tribe’s Indian country.71  
Special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction also has subject-matter 
limitations. A tribe may prosecute only acts of dating violence, acts of 
domestic violence, and violations of protective orders. 72  The new 
jurisdiction does not, therefore, cover stranger rape or other assaults where 
the victim has no prior “social relationship of a romantic or intimate 
nature”73 with the defendant.74  
 
65 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(6) (Supp. 2013). 
66 Id. § 1304(a)(4). 
67 See id. § 1304(a)(3) (giving “Indian country” the meaning given in 18 U.S.C. § 1151); see 
also 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (listing the three “Indian country” categories). See generally COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 6, § 3.04[2][c] (providing more context and 
background about the three categories). 
68 “Indian” is not defined in the statute. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a). Courts will likely apply the 
definition of Indian developed in United States v. Rogers and its progeny. See supra note 47 and 
accompanying text. 
69 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 2013). 
70 Id. § 1304(b)(4)(A)(ii). 
71 Id. § 1304(b)(4)(B). 
72 Id. § 1304(c) (Supp. 2013). 
73 Id. § 1304(a)(1). 
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Last but not least, Congress expressly required prosecuting tribes to 
provide defendants with particular individual rights:  
• for defendants at risk of imprisonment, all the rights of defendants 
guaranteed in the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. § 
1302(c), which include  
o “the effective assistance of counsel at least equal to that 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution,” 
o “a defense attorney licensed to practice law,” 
o a judge who is licensed to practice law and “has sufficient 
legal training to preside over criminal prosecutions,” 
o publicly available criminal laws, rules of evidence, and rules 
of criminal procedure, and 
o a record of the criminal proceeding;75 
• an impartial jury that “reflect[s] a fair cross section of the community” 
and does not discriminate against non-Indians;  
• “all other rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution 
of the United States in order for Congress to recognize and affirm the 
inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction over the defendant”; and 
• the right to seek habeas relief in federal court.76 
Apart from the VAWA 2013 statute, defendants must also receive other 
constitutional rights guaranteed by ICRA: 
• the right “against unreasonable searches and seizures,” so that 
probable cause is required before a search or seizure, 
• the right against double jeopardy, 
• the right against self-incrimination, 
• the right to a speedy and public trial, 
 
74 As defined in the statute, “dating violence” requires at least a “social relationship of a 
romantic or intimate nature” to qualify as subject matter that tribes may prosecute. Id. “Domestic 
violence” requires even more from the prior relationship: domestic violence is defined under the 
statute as “violence committed by a current or former spouse or intimate partner of the victim, by 
a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or 
has cohabitated with the victim as a spouse or intimate partner, or by a person similarly situated to 
a spouse of the victim.” Id. § 1304(a)(2). Violations of protective orders require the victim to have 
had a prior relationship with the defendant that was sufficient to obtain the requisite “injunction, 
restraining order, or other order issued by a civil or criminal court for the purpose of preventing 
violent or threatening acts or harassment against, sexual violence against, contact or 
communication with, or physical proximity to, [the victim].” Id. § 1304(a)(5). 
75 Id. § 1302(c) (2012). 
76 Id. § 1304(d), (e) (Supp. 2013). 
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• the right to be “confronted with the witnesses against him” and to 
subpoena friendly witnesses, 
• the right against excessive bail, excessive fines, and “cruel and unusual 
punishments,” 
• the right against bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, and 
• the right to a trial by a jury of at least six persons.77 
Congress passed VAWA 2013’s special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction with all these territorial, personal, subject-matter, and rights-
based limitations. And, as with tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians 
in the Duro fix, Congress intended special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction to flow from inherent tribal sovereignty: “The powers of self-
government of a participating tribe include the inherent power of that tribe, 
which is hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction over all persons.”78  
Given Congress’s view that tribes act as independent sovereigns when 
exercising special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, the statute also 
allows for concurrent state and federal jurisdiction to prosecute these crimes 
in Indian country.79 The statute thus contemplates that states exercising 
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country under Public Law 28080 may still do 
so.81 And if the federal government prosecutes a defendant for the same 
 
77 Id. § 1302(a). A defendant may invoke the rights listed in § 1302(a) against any “Indian 
tribe exercising powers of self-government.” Id. “Powers of self-government” are defined to 
include “the inherent power of Indian tribes . . . to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.” 
Id. § 1301(2) (2012) (emphasis added). VAWA 2013 added that, “in addition to all powers of self-
government recognized and affirmed by section[] 1301 . . . , the powers of self-government of a 
participating tribe include the inherent power of that tribe . . . to exercise special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons.” Id. § 1304(b)(1) (Supp. 2013) (emphasis added); see 
also H.R. REP. NO. 112-480, at 58 (2012) (noting that ICRA would apply in prosecutions brought 
under special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction). 
78 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
79 Id. § 1304(b)(2). 
80 See supra note 6 for a discussion of Public Law 280 and how it confers criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian country to select states. 
81 Even if special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction is found to be a tribal exercise of 
delegated federal authority, a state prosecution brought before or after a tribal prosecution for the 
same crime would not present a double jeopardy problem. Federal and state authorities may bring 
separate prosecutions for the same conduct, because the federal and state governments are separate 
sovereigns. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 193-95 (1959) (declining to overrule the 
separate-sovereigns principle); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 122-23 (1959) (rejecting the 
defendant’s double jeopardy claim when “[t]he state and federal prosecutions were separately 
conducted”); Orin Kerr, Cert Petition Asks Court to Overturn “Dual Sovereignty” Doctrine in Double 
Jeopardy Law, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 13, 2013, 3:29 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/06/13/cert-
petition-asks-court-to-overturn-dual-sovereignty-doctrine-in-double-jeopardy-law [http://perma.cc/ 
DAJ5-26PQ] (“Despite its text, the Double Jeopardy clause has been interpreted by the Supreme 
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crime before or after a tribal prosecution under VAWA 2013’s special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, the statute implies that a double 
jeopardy challenge to either prosecution would not succeed—the “separate 
sovereigns” doctrine would allow both prosecutions to go on.82 
B. Pilot Projects 
Although special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction took effect 
nationwide on March 7, 2015, VAWA 2013 authorized “pilot projects” 
whereby select tribes could commence exercising the jurisdiction on an 
accelerated basis before the nationwide start date, so long as the pilot 
project tribes had demonstrated to the Attorney General and Secretary of 
the Interior that they had “adequate safeguards in place to protect 
defendants’ rights.”83 Five tribal pilot project applications were approved 
prior to March 7, 2015: those of the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the 
Fort Peck Indian Reservation in Montana, of the Confederated Tribes of 
the Umatilla Indian Reservation in Oregon, of the Pascua Yaqui Tribe of 
Arizona, of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse Reservation 
in South Dakota, and of the Tulalip Tribes of Washington.84 
The Pascua Yaqui Tribe was among the first to bring prosecutions. By 
April 2014, the Pascua Yaqui had already arrested and charged three 
defendants.85 By June 2014, the number had increased to twelve.86 And by 
 
Court to allow both the federal government and a state government to bring charges for the same 
conduct because they are separate sovereigns.”). A recent petition for certiorari asked the Court to 
revisit the dual-sovereignty doctrine, but the Court declined to do so. See Roach v. Missouri, 134 
S. Ct. 118 (2013) (denying the petition for certiorari); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Roach, 
134 S. Ct. 118 (No. 12-1394) (“The question presented is whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars 
a state prosecution for a criminal offense when the defendant has previously been convicted of the 
same offense in federal court.”). 
82 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
83 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 908(2), 127 
Stat. 54, 125-26 (Mar. 7, 2013) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304 note on effective dates and pilot 
project (Supp. 2013)). 
84 VAWA 2013 Pilot Project, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/tribal/vawa-2013-
pilot-project [http://perma.cc/XF5B-HSJ2] (last updated Mar. 13, 2015). 
85 See Sari Horwitz, Arizona Tribe Set to Prosecute First Non-Indian Under a New Law, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/arizona-tribe-set-to-prosecute-
first-non-indian-under-a-new-law/2014/04/18/127a202a-bf20-11e3-bcec-
b71ee10e9bc3_story.html[http://perma.cc/6FTS-STTW] (noting the then-pending cases against 
defendants Eloy Figueroa Lopez, Tony R. Slaton, and Myxay Yongbanthom); Steve Straeley, 
First Trial of a Non-Native American in a Tribal Court, ALLGOV (Apr. 21, 2014), 
http://www.allgov.com/news/ controversies/first-trial-of-a-non-native-american-in-a-tribal-court-
140421?news=852965 [http://perma.cc/EA48-7ZP2] (discussing Lopez’s case). 
86 See Jacelle Ramon-Sauberan, VAWA Already Improving Life for the Pascqua Yaqui Tribe, 
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK.COM (June 9, 2014), http://indiancountrytoday 
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March 2015, it was at least sixteen.87 The tribe’s first VAWA trial took place 
in November 2014 and dealt with an atypical same-sex partnership case.88 In 
that closely watched trial, the defendant was acquitted because the jury 
failed to find the intimate relationship required for special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction (the defendant argued that he was a 
roommate, not a romantic partner).89 
Other pilot project tribes had to change their laws and court procedures 
before receiving pilot project approval,90 but they too began exercising 
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction prior to March 7, 2015: of the 
twenty-three defendants prosecuted under special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction by March 2015, sixteen had been prosecuted by the 
Pascua Yaqui, five by the Tulalip Tribes, and two by the Confederated 
Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation.91 Although many of the cases are 
pending as of this writing, nine had already ended in plea deals.92 
The implementing tribes were aware that special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction could face legal challenge, and they aimed “to 
implement the law well, so that when some case comes along, it’s a good 
vehicle.”93 The Umatilla Tribes even offered to waive tribal exhaustion 
 
medianetwork.com / 2014 / 06 / 09 / vawa-already-improving-life-pascuayaqui-tribe-155209?page=0%2C1 
[http://perma.cc/8MP3-2N2K] (“The tribe currently has 12 VAWA investigations that have lead 
to arrests of non-Native Americans . . . .”). 
87 See Laird, supra note 12 (“As of March, the three tribes [approved for pilot projects] had 
prosecuted 23 defendants on a total of 38 criminal counts: 16 defendants by Pascua Yaqui, five by 
Tulalip and two by Umatilla.”); Laurel Morales, Native Americans Can Prosecute Non-Natives in 
Tribal Court, FRONTERAS DESK (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.fronterasdesk.org/content/9971/ 
native-americans-can-prosecute-non-natives-tribal-court [http://perma.cc/3GL9-NVNU] (noting 
the Pascua Yaqui Attorney General’s comments about the tribe’s nineteen VAWA cases). 
88 Laird, supra note 12. 
89 Id. 
90 See Criminal Court Directive, CONFEDERATED TRIBES UMATILLA INDIAN 
RESERVATION (Jan. 22, 2014), http://ctuir.org/system/files/Criminal%20Court%20Directive%201-
22-24.pdf [http://perma.cc/67DZ-K6CJ] (implementing new procedural rules); Richard Peterson, 
Prosecution of Non-Indians Now Under Tribal Jurisdiction, FORT PECK J. ONLINE (Mar. 12, 2015), 
http://www.fortpeckjournal.net/2015/03/12/ prosecution - of - non - indians - now - under - tribal - 
jurisdiction/#sthash.Km4DHhZT.dpbs [http://perma.cc/6QDX-29D7] (“Fort Peck had to change 
parts of its code and some court procedures to give non-Indians their constitutional rights in tribal 
court . . . .”). Some tribes have also organized a working group to provide “peer-to-peer” advice 
and information about how best to implement special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction. See 
About ITWG, NAT’L CONG. AM. INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/pilot-project-
itwg/about-itwg [http://perma.cc/6BQN-EDMB] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (describing the 
Intertribal Technical-Assistance Working Group on Special Domestic Violence Criminal 
Jurisdiction (ITWG)). 
91 Laird, supra note 12. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. (quoting John Dossett, General Counsel of the National Congress of American Indians). 
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requirements, hoping that their first defendant would bring a habeas suit, 
but the defendant declined to do so.94 
C. Nationwide Launch 
After March 7, 2015, tribes nationwide could implement special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction without going through the pilot project 
process. According to the Department of Justice in May 2015, about forty 
tribes planned to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, 
and they were “gearing up to ensure that the requisite legal safeguards are 
in place.”95 In June 2015, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians was preparing 
to implement special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, and the tribe 
had already signed a new ordinance allowing for an impartial jury.96 
Government agencies continue to support tribal efforts to begin VAWA 
2013 prosecutions.97 
As more tribes implement VAWA 2013, more prosecutions of non-
Indian defendants are inevitable—and so are legal challenges to the 
jurisdictional framework. Objections about special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction’s constitutionality have not abated.98 The next Parts 
explore possible legal challenges to the jurisdictional framework, how courts 
might analyze them, and how their eventual outcome could impact special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction. 
 
94 Id. Dossett speculated that most defendants “want to get over it and get on with their 
lives” and “don’t want to be the big test case.” Id. After all, thirteen years elapsed between the 
Duro fix and the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold it in Lara. Id. 
95 Miranda S. Spivack, Tribal Law on Domestic Violence Takes Effect, WOMEN’S ENEWS 
(May 13, 2015), http://womensenews.org/story/domestic-violence/150512/tribal-law-domestic-
violence-takes-effect [http://perma.cc/3KZC-4LTP]. 
96  See Scott McKie, Tribe Asserts DV Jurisdiction over Non-Indians, CHEROKEE ONE 
FEATHER (June 16, 2015), http://theonefeather.com/2015/06/tribe-asserts-dv-jurisdiction-over-
non-indians [http://perma.cc/U2TT-YT8J. 
97 See, e.g., Press Release, Bureau of Indian Affairs Office of Justice Services, U.S. Dep’t of 
the Interior, BIA Office of Justice Services in Conjunction With the Tulalip Tribes Will Co-Host 
VAWA Tribal Trial Advocacy Skills Training in September (Aug. 26, 2015), 
http://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc1-031537.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
L96W-9AKF]. 
98 See, e.g., Stephen Fee et al., Tribal Justice: Prosecuting Non-Natives for Sexual Assault on 
Reservations, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 5, 2015, 1:08 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/tribal-
justice-prosecuting-non-natives-sexual-assault-indian-reservations [http://perma.cc/VCV6-EBLV] 
(reporting on former U.S. Senator Tom Coburn’s criticisms, and quoting him as saying that “this 
provision will eventually be thrown out, be challenged, and on appeal they’ll lose, because you 
cannot guarantee American citizens their constitutional rights if they’re non-tribal members in a 
tribal court”). 
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III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST INHERENT TRIBAL 
SOVEREIGNTY TO PROSECUTE NON-INDIANS                                   
UNDER VAWA 2013 
A. Why Inherent Tribal Sovereignty Matters 
When the eventual test case does come before a federal court for review, 
VAWA 2013’s framework for special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction 
will likely force the court to adjudicate the bounds of inherent tribal 
sovereignty.99 The scope of inherent tribal sovereignty matters a great deal 
for non-Indian defendants, because it determines whether the non-Indian 
defendants must receive all the federal constitutional rights that they would 
receive in federal or state court. If defendants’ tribal prosecutions are a 
delegation of federal authority, then the defendants have a colorable legal 
claim that they should receive the full panoply of federal constitutional 
rights. But if the tribal prosecutions are actions of a separate sovereign, then 
the federal Bill of Rights—and much of the federal Constitution—is 
inapplicable. 100  The defendant would thus receive only those federal 
constitutional protections codified in the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA),101 
and required by statute under VAWA 2013.102 The defendant would not 
receive, for example, the benefit of the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury 
indictment requirement.103 
Thus, when federal constitutional rights not codified in ICRA or VAWA 
2013 will determine the outcome of a defendant’s case, the bounds of 
inherent tribal sovereignty become very important indeed. And, in practice, 
the gap between (1) all federal constitutional rights and (2) defendants’ 
rights under ICRA and VAWA 2013 is more than just the number of rights 
missing in ICRA and VAWA 2013; tribal courts interpreting ICRA rights 
need not always interpret them identically to the corresponding federal 
 
99 See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text (showing how the inherent-sovereignty 
question could affect the analysis of non-Indian defendants’ constitutional challenges). 
100 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“As separate sovereigns pre-
existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those 
constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.”); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 112-480, at 58-59 (2012) (“Non-Indians tried within the Indian Tribal government 
system would not be guaranteed their full constitutional rights . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 48 
(2012) (Minority Views from Sens. Kyl, Hatch, Sessions, and Coburn) (“Courts have held, for 
example, that tribal governments are not bound by the Constitution’s First, Fifth, or Fourteenth 
Amendments.”). 
101 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2012). 
102 See supra Section II.A for a list of express protections that VAWA provides to defendants. 
103 See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 63 n.14 (“[Section] 1302 does not require tribal criminal 
prosecutions to be initiated by grand jury indictment . . . .”). 
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constitutional rights. 104  For example, some federal common law 
constitutional rights, such as the right to Miranda warnings under the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments,105 are not imputed into the analogous ICRA and 
VAWA 2013 provisions.106 Additionally, though both ICRA and the federal 
Constitution provide defendants with the right against double jeopardy, the 
inherent-sovereignty question will determine whether tribal and federal 
prosecutions brought consecutively would violate the federal Double 
Jeopardy Clause: as shown by Lara, if tribal criminal jurisdiction derives 
from inherent tribal sovereignty, then no double jeopardy problem exists.107 
Figure 1 illustrates the difference between (1) federal constitutional rights 
and (2) ICRA and VAWA 2013 rights.   
 
104 See generally Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at 
Thirty Years, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 465, 496 (1998) (“[T]he courts routinely have ruled that the 
meaning and application of the ICRA is not determined by Anglo-American constitutional 
interpretations.”); id. at 513 (concluding that, in tribal courts, “cultural considerations sometimes 
contribute to unique interpretations” of ICRA rights). 
105 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (holding that, to protect a criminal 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, the defendant “must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain 
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the 
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him 
prior to any questioning if he so desires”). But see Singh, supra note 7, at 223-25 (discussing 
Miranda rights and concluding that the constitutional “catch-all” provision could resolve any 
constitutional defects created by Miranda and other federal common law rights). 
106 The ICRA analogue to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is codified 
at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4) (2012).  
The VAWA 2013 analogue to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1304(d)(2) (Supp. 2013), which incorporates by reference, for defendants facing imprisonment, 
rights guaranteed under ICRA to defendants facing imprisonment for longer than one year. See 25 
U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2012). Those rights include “the right to effective assistance of counsel at least 
equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution.” Id. § 1302(c)(1). But even if the 
VAWA 2013 right to counsel mirrors the federal right to counsel, the ICRA right against self-
incrimination would not necessarily replicate the federal right against self-incrimination. See supra 
note 102 and accompanying text. Thus, Miranda rights are not presumed to apply to tribal arrests. 
107 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. The answer to the inherent-sovereignty question 
would also answer the antecedent question about whether the federal Double Jeopardy Clause or 
the ICRA double jeopardy provision governs the tribal prosecution. If special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction flows from inherent tribal sovereignty, then the ICRA double jeopardy 
provision would apply, and consecutive tribal and federal prosecutions for the same conduct would 
be permissible (so long as the tribe does not prosecute the defendant more than once for the same 
conduct). But if special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction is delegated federal authority, then 
the federal Double Jeopardy Clause is in play, and consecutive tribal and federal prosecutions 
would violate the Clause, because both prosecutions would be federal. 
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Figure 1: Inherent Tribal Sovereignty’s Significance to Defendants’ Rights 
 
 
 
Of course, to some extent, VAWA 2013’s constitutional “catch-all” 
provision108 resolves the gap between (1) federal constitutional rights and 
(2) ICRA and VAWA 2013 rights; it requires tribes to provide defendants 
with “all other rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution 
of the United States in order for Congress to recognize and affirm the 
inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction over the defendant.” 109  So, even if a 
 
108 See Singh, supra note 7, at 225 (using the term). 
109 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4) (Supp. 2013). 
Complete Federal 
Constitutional 
Rights 
ICRA and 
VAWA 2013 
Rights 
Rights that Turn on Whether Special Domestic Violence Criminal 
Jurisdiction Flows from Inherent Tribal Sovereignty or  
Delegated Federal Authority 
(e.g., the federal right against double jeopardy,  
the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury,  
Article II and Article III separation of powers structural guarantees,  
federal constitutional rights with analogues in ICRA and VAWA 2013  
that are less defendant-protective  
in tribal courts than in federal courts) 
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prosecution is found unconstitutional for failure to provide a defendant 
with a particular right guaranteed by the federal Constitution,110 later tribal 
prosecutions in other cases could solve the problem by ensuring defendants 
receive rights identical to those under the federal Constitution. 
But even the “catch-all” provision would not be enough to overcome 
double jeopardy, Article II, or Article III concerns. United States v. Lara111 is 
the obvious example of why inherent tribal sovereignty will always matter 
to a defendant bringing a double jeopardy claim. If tribal prosecutions of 
non-Indian defendants flow from delegated federal authority, then a tribe 
could not prosecute conduct that was already the subject of a federal 
prosecution, no matter how many rights the defendants would have under 
tribal criminal procedure. To avoid double jeopardy problems, federal and 
tribal prosecutors would have to cooperate and agree not duplicate each 
other’s efforts.112 
But such pragmatic solutions do not exist for the Article II and Article 
III problems that might surface if a court adjudicates any federal 
constitutional claim brought by a defendant and refuses to find inherent 
tribal sovereignty to prosecute non-Indian defendants. As Paul Larkin, Jr., 
and Joseph Lupino-Esposito of the Heritage Foundation have argued,113 
Article II requires federal judges to be appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate, 114  and Article III mandates life tenure and 
undiminished compensation for federal judges. 115  Larkin and Lupino-
Esposito opine that “[b]ecause tribal judges don’t necessarily have those 
guarantees and are appointed by tribes,” they do not meet the 
Constitution’s Article II and Article III requirements, and special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction is therefore impermissible as a delegation of 
 
110 A tribal prosecution could be found unconstitutional by the tribal trial court itself, by an 
appellate tribal court, or by a federal court on habeas review. ICRA guarantees federal habeas 
review of tribal criminal convictions, and VAWA 2013’s special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction incorporates that protection by reference. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
111 541 U.S. 193 (2004); see also supra Section I.C (discussing Lara). 
112  See, e.g., OR. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OREGON DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CRIME 
VICTIMS’ SERVICES DIVISION TRIBAL NATION LISTENING TOUR 1-2 (2013), 
http://www.tribal-institute.org/2014/E11HandOut2.pdf [http://perma.cc/C4GR-L6SJ] (discussing 
Oregon’s statewide VAWA implementation plan, administered with cooperation from the Oregon 
Department of Justice, tribal representatives, and the U.S. Department of Justice); Ernestine 
Chasing Hawk, Tribes Discuss Prosecution of Non-Indians on Tribal Lands, NAVAJO TIMES (Apr. 8, 
2015), http://navajotimes.com / wires-wp / index.php?id=1595618643&kid = SmB5ZcRvalt332nL 
[http://perma.cc/SF2G-CACZ] (reporting that federal prosecutors in Oregon, North Dakota, and 
South Dakota met with tribal officials to discuss how to jointly implement VAWA 2013).  
113 See Larkin & Lupino-Esposito, supra note 13, at 8-9, 17-39. 
114 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
115 Id. art. III, § 1. 
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federal authority.116 A full treatment of these issues lies beyond the scope of 
this Comment, but suffice it to say that these structural defects could prove 
impossible for tribes to cure.117 
 
116 Laird, supra note 12 (paraphrasing Larkin); see also Larkin & Lupino-Esposito, supra note 
13, at 8-9, 17-39. 
117 If courts rule that special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction stems from delegated 
federal authority rather than inherent tribal sovereignty, tribes could answer the Article III 
contentions by arguing that the jurisdiction is still valid as an exercise of jurisdiction by a 
congressionally sanctioned non-Article III court—i.e., an Article I court created by the legislature. 
See generally 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3528 (3d ed. 2015) (examining the jurisprudence surrounding Article I legislative courts); Larkin 
& Lupino-Esposito, supra note 13, at 26 (“The Supreme Court has held in several different 
contexts that Congress may vest in other courts, known as ‘Article I courts,’ the authority to 
adjudicate rights and responsibilities of parties to a dispute even if judges who lack life tenure and 
salary protection enjoyed by Article III judges preside over those courts.”). 
But the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence surrounding Article I legislative courts is not settled, 
and it is difficult to predict how the Supreme Court might view a claim that tribal courts are 
actually Article I legislative courts. Larkin and Lupino-Esposito argue that the Court would 
invalidate tribal courts because they do not fall under the traditional categories of Article I 
legislative courts upheld by the Supreme Court. Larkin & Lupino-Esposito, supra note 13, at 26-
39; see also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2610 (2011) (following the categorical approach to 
Article I courts adopted by Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 
50 (1982)); Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 64-70 (recognizing three valid categories of Article 
I courts: (1) territorial courts and District of Columbia courts, (2) military courts-martial, 
and (3) courts and agencies created to adjudicate “public rights”). The Supreme Court could, 
however, follow a less-categorical balancing approach, like the one endorsed in CFTC v. Schor. See 
478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (adopting an approach to reviewing Article III challenges that “weighed a 
number of factors, none of which has been deemed determinative, with an eye to the practical 
effect . . . on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary”). Indeed, the Court’s 
recent decisions about the validity of bankruptcy courts appear to veer towards the Schor approach. 
See Wellness Int’l Network v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1942-44 (2015) (citing and discussing Schor 
with approval); Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2173 (2014) (retreating in 
part from Stern’s strict categorical approach); Daniel Bussel, Commentary: Wellness after Stern, 
SCOTUSBLOG (May. 28, 2015, 10:19 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/05/commentary-
wellness-after-stern [http://perma.cc/LPF2-7NHK] (“Wellness and Arkison both eschew the 
formalism of Stern and adopt functionalist perspectives to Article III to uphold pre-Stern 
practices.”). 
The Article II contentions, on the other hand, could prove even more difficult to surmount 
than the Article III issues. Even if tribal courts are Article I legislative courts, Article II and the 
Appointments Clause would apply to tribal judges exercising delegated federal authority. See 
Larkin & Lupino-Esposito, supra note 13, at 20. And Article II would constrain not just tribal 
judges, but also tribal prosecutors, who might—like U.S. Attorneys—likewise fall under the 
Appointments Clause’s reach. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 216 (2004) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (noting that “the power to bring federal prosecutions, which is part of 
the putative delegated power, is manifestly and quintessentially executive power” and Congress 
cannot transfer it “to individuals who are beyond meaningful Presidential control” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
Remedying the Article II issues might hypothetically require tribes to submit to presidential 
appointment and Senate confirmation of tribal judges and prosecutors. But this course of action is 
objectionable from the tribal perspective. Tribes are already concerned about “losing the features 
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B. No Inherent Tribal Sovereignty to Prosecute Non-Indians: Oliphant, History, 
and Political Representation Concerns 
On the actual question of whether special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction flows from inherent tribal sovereignty, credible justifications 
exist for both possible answers. A court adjudicating the issue will have to 
choose which set of justifications it finds more persuasive. 
A non-Indian defendant could begin by arguing that Oliphant’s reasoning 
is still applicable, even if Congress partially overrode its holding. In other 
words, even if Congress gave tribes statutory jurisdiction to try and punish 
non-Indians, Indian tribes still “do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and 
to punish non-Indians.”118 Further, Oliphant rested its holding on the notion 
that inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians was inconsistent with 
tribes’ status as dependent nations,119 and there is no reason to believe that 
this underlying presumption has changed. Although Oliphant did seem to 
contemplate that tribes might have power “to try non-Indian citizens of the 
United States . . . in a manner acceptable to Congress” (which would appear to 
endorse upholding VAWA 2013’s special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction),120 a non-Indian defendant could counter with the argument 
that Oliphant’s dictum merely referred to statutory delegations of federal 
authority—not inherent tribal authority to punish.121 
Apart from Oliphant, a defendant might also argue that history does not 
support inherent tribal authority to prosecute non-Indians. As discussed 
above, early treaties might support the notion that tribes were not, at the 
beginning of the Republic, understood to have authority to prosecute non-
Indians (though, of course, the early treaties might also support the opposite 
 
of their own justice traditions” through VAWA 2013’s special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction. Laird, supra note 12; see also Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation 
that Overturned It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 767, 801 (1993) 
(noting how applying even the Bill of Rights to tribal prosecutions “would seriously interfere with 
tribal culture and the values incorporated in tribal laws”). Imposing additional federal oversight 
would only exacerbate these concerns. 
118 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (emphasis added). 
119 Id. at 206-11; see also supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (discussing Oliphant’s holding). 
120 Oliphant, 436 U.S. at 210. 
121 Post-Oliphant, the Supreme Court has affirmed that “[i]n the main . . . the inherent sovereign 
powers of an Indian tribe—those powers a tribe enjoys apart from express provision by treaty or 
statute—do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.” Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 
520 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1997) (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). These precedents, however, came before the 2004 Lara decision, which 
upheld Congress’s decision to extend tribes’ inherent sovereign powers to nonmembers (specifically, 
nonmember Indians). See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004). Thus, allusions to Strate 
and Montana would have limited weight in a challenge to VAWA 2013’s special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction. 
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proposition as well).122 A defendant could also point to ICRA, which did not 
include criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in its recognition of tribes’ 
“inherent power,” even after the Duro fix.123 However, the Duro fix to ICRA, 
enacted twenty-five years ago in 1990,124 could simply reflect Congress’s 
choice to “relax restrictions”125 on inherent tribal sovereignty to a lesser extent 
at that time; Congress might have intended to further relax former 
restrictions by enacting special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction. To 
this, a defendant could argue that, Congress still cannot give tribes more 
inherent sovereignty than they ever possessed before. The defendant could 
then cite early treaties and the like to support the underlying assumption that 
tribes’ inherent sovereignty never included criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. In Justice Kennedy’s words, “[i]t is a most troubling proposition to 
say that Congress can relax the restrictions on inherent tribal sovereignty in a 
way that extends that sovereignty beyond . . . historical limits.”126 
From a policy perspective, a defendant arguing against inherent tribal 
sovereignty can continue to echo Justice Kennedy by citing political 
representation concerns, which Justice Kennedy raised in both his Lara 
concurrence and his opinion for the Court in Duro. In Lara, he opined that 
subjecting a defendant “to a sovereignty outside the basic structure of the 
Constitution” violates the basic constitutional theory of “original, and 
continuing, consent of the governed.”127 Though a given tribe’s members 
consent to that tribe’s extraconstitutional sovereignty, nonmember 
Indians—and certainly non-Indians—do not. 128  Hence, in Duro, Justice 
Kennedy wrote for the Court that “in the criminal sphere membership marks 
the bounds of tribal authority.”129 And even if non-Indians have consented to 
Congress’s ability (as the federal legislature) to act in the field of Indian 
affairs, a defendant could argue that there are “constitutional limitations 
even on the ability of Congress to subject American citizens to criminal 
 
122 See supra Section I.A. 
123 See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012) (“‘[P]owers of self-government’ means . . . the inherent 
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all 
Indians . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text (discussing how 
the Duro fix codified the statutory bounds of tribal criminal jurisdiction so that it would reach 
nonmember Indians, but not non-Indians). 
124 See Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, sec. 8077(b)–(c), § 201(2), 104 Stat. 1856, 
1892-93 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), (4)). 
125 Lara, 541 U.S. at 196. 
126 Id. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 5, 1990, 
§ 8077(b)–(c), 104 Stat. at 1892-93, as recognized in Lara, 541 U.S. 193. 
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proceedings before a tribunal that does not provide constitutional 
protections as a matter of right.”130 
C. Inherent Tribal Sovereignty to Prosecute Non-Indians: History, Lara,         
the Executive Branch, and Public Policy 
To support inherent tribal authority to exercise special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction, a tribe can credibly raise numerous 
arguments to rebut the defendant’s arguments discussed above. A tribe 
could cite history and early treaties just as easily as a defendant, but for the 
opposite purpose: to show that early treaties did in fact recognize inherent 
tribal authority to try and punish non-Indians.131 Further, pre-Oliphant 
tribal codes asserted criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.132 
The tribe could also draw easy analogies to Lara: The Duro fix language 
at issue in Lara and the VAWA 2013 language at issue here contain very 
similar clauses recognizing and affirming tribes’ inherent sovereignty.133 The 
statutory inherent-power language was important to the Court’s decision in 
Lara,134 so it should carry weight as a signal of congressional intent here.135 
 
130 Id. A tribe might also defend special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction by arguing 
“hypothetical consent,” whereby consent is presumed when “a reasonable person subjected to 
government control would consent to such control.” Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Resisting Federal 
Courts on Tribal Jurisdiction, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 973, 991 (2010). Professor Fletcher suggests that 
“Justice Kennedy's rhetoric invoking the consent of the governed rings hollow at least in cases 
where a reasonable person would not object to tribal laws.” Id. at 991-92. But allowing 
hypothetical consent in a civil matter is not the same as doing so in a criminal matter, where more 
fundamental intrusions on personal liberty are at stake. See Gede, supra note 1, at 43 (contrasting 
the civil and criminal contexts). A hypothetical-consent argument would appear to respond 
inadequately to the political representation concerns that VAWA 2013 presents. 
131 See supra Section I.A (explaining how the early treaties could support both broad and 
narrow views of inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants). 
132 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196 (1978) (“Of the 127 reservation 
court systems that currently exercise criminal jurisdiction in the United States, 33 purport to 
extend that jurisdiction to non-Indians.”).  
133 Compare Act of Nov. 5, 1990, sec. 8077(b), § 201(2), 104 Stat. at 1892 (“[T]he inherent 
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, [includes the power] to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over all Indians[.]”), with 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1) (Supp. 2013) (“[T]he inherent power 
of [a participating tribe,] hereby recognized and affirmed, [includes the power] to exercise special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons.”). 
Part IV, infra, discusses Congress’s role in more detail and focuses on the possible significance 
of the congressional plenary power doctrine. 
134 See Lara, 541 U.S. at 199; see also id. at 211 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Congress was 
careful to rely on the theory of inherent sovereignty, and not on a delegation. . . . I would take 
Congress at its word.”). 
135 The actual legislative history of VAWA 2013’s Indian country provisions also supports the 
notion that Congress intended special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction to flow from 
inherent tribal sovereignty. See S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 9 n.23 (2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court has 
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Additionally, the expansion of tribal criminal jurisdiction is narrow,136 and 
the Court upheld the Duro fix in Lara because it made a similarly “limited” 
change to the existing tribal criminal jurisdiction.137 VAWA 2013’s special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction extends tribal criminal jurisdiction 
to a narrow subset of possible non-Indian defendants, whose prosecutions 
must have specific territorial, personal, subject-matter, and rights-based 
prerequisites required by statute.138 
To the extent that a court may want to defer to the Executive Branch,139 
it is noteworthy that federal administrators support special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction as it was enacted in VAWA 2013. In fact, the 
key VAWA 2013 Indian country provisions were first drafted and proposed 
by the Department of Justice in 2011.140 And the Department of Justice has 
made at least one federal–tribal agreement in which it designated a tribal 
prosecutor as a “Special Assistant U.S. Attorney with expanded authority 
over domestic violence cases.”141 
 
indicated that Congress has the power to recognize and thus restore tribes’ ‘inherent power’ to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians and non-Indians.” (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206-12 (1978))); see also Singh, supra note 7, at 218 (summarizing the 
legislative history). 
136 See supra Section II.A. 
137 Lara, 541 U.S. at 204 (majority opinion). 
138 See supra Section II.A. 
139 See Lara, 541 U.S. at 205 (noting that the shared presumption of the Executive Branch, 
Congress, and the lower courts would carry considerable weight); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831) (holding nonjusticiable the Cherokee Nation’s suit for relief against the 
state of Georgia’s efforts to obtain control over tribal lands, and noting that the matter was “too 
much [like] the exercise of political power to be within the proper province of the judicial 
department”). See generally 13C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3534.2 (2014) (discussing how federal Indian law cases have invoked the political 
question doctrine to defer to the Executive Branch’s judgment about Indian policy).  
140 See Letter from Tony West, Acting Assoc. Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Tribal Leader (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.tribal-institute.org/download/Drug%20Court/Invitation 
%20to%20Tribal%20Consultation%20April%202013.pdf [http://perma.cc/AU5X-YL2X] (“[B]oth 
[sections 904 and 908 of VAWA 2013] . . . were initially drafted and proposed to Congress by the 
Department of Justice in 2011.”). 
141 Chris Winters, Tulalips Wield New Power Against Domestic Violence, HERALDNET (July 14, 
2014, 9:17 PM), http://heraldnet.com/article/20140714/NEWS01/140719464/Tulalips-wield-new-
power-against-domestic-violence [http://perma.cc/92FX-FZL8]. The designation “Special U.S. 
Attorney” could appear to imply that the tribal prosecutor acts under delegated federal authority, 
but the Tulalip Tribes have received pilot project approval to exercise special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction in their own tribal courts and using their own tribal judges. See OFFICE OF 
THE RESERVATION ATTORNEY, TULALIP TRIBES OF WASH., TULALIP TRIBES FINAL 
APPLICATION QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE VAWA PILOT PROJECT ON TRIBAL CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTION (2013), http://www.justice.gov/tribal/docs/appl-questionnaire-tulalip.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/KHD6-353G]; see also VAWA 2013 Pilot Project, supra note 84 (noting that the 
Tulalip Tribes had received pilot-project approval). 
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Last but not least, tribes can cite compelling policy considerations to 
support upholding special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction as flowing 
from inherent tribal sovereignty. Most compellingly, expanded tribal 
jurisdiction seeks to ameliorate the much-documented high rate of domestic 
violence against Indian women, which is perpetuated by the law 
enforcement gap in prosecutions of non-Indians in Indian country. 142 
Furthermore, from an institutional competence perspective, a tribe could 
argue—and cite Lara for the proposition—that Congress is better equipped 
than the Court to resolve and decide these jurisdictional issues.143 
As the past two Sections detail, colorable arguments exist on both sides 
of the inherent tribal sovereignty question. But one of the arguments—the 
weight of congressional intent144—carries such historical force in federal 
Indian law145 that it could play more than the supporting role that it did in 
Lara.146 The next Part takes a brief look at the congressional plenary power 
doctrine and how advocates and courts could give it a leading role in 
litigation over special domestic violence jurisdiction’s future. 
 
142 See S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 7-9 (2012) (acknowledging and describing the “crisis” of 
domestic violence and sexual assault against tribal victims); AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 8, at 2 
(reporting that Indian women “are more than 2.5 times more likely to be raped or sexually 
assaulted than women in the USA in general”); Singh, supra note 7, at 198-99 (summarizing the 
“dire” need for more protection for Indian women against domestic and sexual violence); Laird, 
supra note 12 (reporting that “two out of five Indian women reported being battered in their 
lifetimes” and that eighty-eight percent of perpetrators of violent crimes against Indian women are 
non-Indian); see also supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text (discussing the enforcement gap). 
143 See Lara, 541 U.S. at 205 (expressing disapproval for the Court “second-guessing” the 
political branches’ determinations); see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 706-07 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“The touchstone in determining the extent to which citizens can be subject to the 
jurisdiction of Indian tribes, therefore, is whether such jurisdiction is acceptable to Congress.”). 
144 See supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text. 
145 See infra Section IV.A for historical background. 
146 The Lara opinion mentioned Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs as just one of 
six reasons for finding inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. See Lara, 541 
U.S. at 200 (discussing Congress’s “plenary and exclusive” powers in the Indian law arena); id. at 
200-07 (listing and discussing six justifications for upholding the Duro fix). 
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IV. CONGRESS’S PLENARY POWER OVER INDIAN AFFAIRS AND HOW 
IT COULD AFFECT SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTION 
A. The Congressional Plenary Power Doctrine 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, Congress’s plenary power over 
Indian affairs became a central tenet of federal Indian law.147 The major case 
distilling this principle is United States v. Kagama from 1886.148 In Kagama, 
the Supreme Court derived the plenary power principle from tribes’ status 
as domestic dependent nations149: “The power of the General Government 
over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in 
numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those 
among whom they dwell.” 150  The Court found federal plenary power 
necessary to protect the tribes from often-malicious state governments.151 
Of course, federal plenary power also meant that little could protect the 
tribes from malicious acts of the federal government itself.152 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the Court began using the word 
“plenary” to describe the scope of Congress’s power over Indian affairs.153 
 
147 See Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 
U. PA. L. REV. 195, 207, 212-19 (1984) (labeling “1877-1930’s” as “The Plenary Power Era,” and 
recounting the plenary power doctrine’s rise during that period). 
148 118 U.S. 375 (1886); see also Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. 
L. REV. 31, 34 (1996) (“Kagama was the first case in which the Supreme Court essentially 
embraced the doctrine that Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs.”). 
149 See supra notes 36–37 for a discussion about similar reasoning used in Oliphant to justify 
the lack of inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
150 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384. 
151 See id. (“Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where [Indians] are found 
are often their deadliest enemies.”). In the nineteenth century, non-Indian settlers seeking land in 
the western states were particularly hostile to Indians there, and newly formed state governments 
sometimes endorsed anti-Indian actions—including state-sanctioned murders of Indians. See, e.g., 
gjohnsit, The Great California Genocide, DAILY KOS (Aug. 14, 2008) http://www.dailykos.com/ 
story / 2008 / 08 / 15 / 567667 / -The-Great-California-Genocide [http://perma.cc / 9P9C-5NM8] 
(reporting that the state of California “paid about $1.1 Million in 1852 to militias to hunt down and 
kill [I]ndians”). Of course, the federal government was also responsible for its share of Indian 
massacres. See generally Indian Massacre, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Indian_massacre [http://perma.cc/QM44-P8D6] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (listing Indian 
killings in history and including those perpetrated by both state and federal forces in the 
nineteenth century). 
152 See Newton, supra note 147, at 216-28 (elaborating on how during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, “[federal] policymakers denied tribal Indians the basic freedoms 
accorded other Americans” and cited the plenary power doctrine as their justification). 
153 See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (“Plenary authority over the tribal 
relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning . . . .”); Frank R. 
Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future?, 36 S.D. L. REV. 239, 247 (1991) (citing 
 
  
274 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 243 
 
In the 1903 case Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the Court noted that Congress had 
exercised plenary power over tribal relations “from the beginning,” and so 
Indian affairs “were solely within the domain of legislative authority.”154 
What is more, the Court ruled that Congress’s actions in this domain were 
“conclusive upon the courts.”155 As Professor Pommersheim has written, 
this doctrine, “in its potentially sweeping and pristine form, is awesome” in 
scope. 156  Not only does it endorse congressional authority to legislate 
without limitation, but it also exempts that authority from judicial review.157 
The congressional plenary power doctrine has endured to the present 
day.158 It was cited in Lara to support the Court’s finding of inherent tribal 
authority to prosecute and punish nonmember Indians.159 And as recently as 
2014, the Supreme Court has noted Congress’s “plenary control” over 
Indian tribes.160 Because of its historical import, the plenary power doctrine 
could emerge as a key topic for courts to consider in their deliberations over 
special domestic violence jurisdiction’s constitutionality. 
B. How the Congressional Plenary Power Doctrine Could Affect Special Domestic 
Violence Criminal Jurisdiction 
A court could follow Lara and treat congressional plenary power the way 
the Supreme Court did in that case: as a mere additional argument to 
support finding inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember 
Indians.161 But a court could also reverse the order of operations and address 
the plenary power doctrine first: under this analytical route, a court might 
hold that if Congress has explicitly legislated that special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction is an exercise of inherent tribal sovereignty, then 
 
Lone Wolf as the first instance in which the Supreme Court expounded on the “extravagant 
concept” of congressional plenary power). 
154 Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565, 567-68. 
155 Id. at 567-68. 
156 Pommersheim, supra note 153, at 247. 
157 Id. 
158 See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 6, § 5.02[1] 
(discussing how courts continue to recognize Congress’s “plenary and exclusive authority over 
Indian affairs” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
159 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (“[T]he Constitution grants Congress 
broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have consistently 
described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’”); see also supra note 146 (explaining the role played by the 
plenary power doctrine in Lara’s reasoning). 
160 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014). 
161 See supra note 146 for a discussion of the Court’s use of the plenary power doctrine in 
Lara. 
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Congress’s word is dispositive. 162  Following this reasoning, courts are 
beholden to Congress under the plenary power doctrine, and so they simply 
cannot overturn Congress’s explicit legislation. 
This second analytical route is deceptively simple. To be sure, it quickly 
and easily answers the inherent tribal sovereignty question in the 
affirmative. But a more complex analysis lurks in the background. Instead of 
scrutinizing the metes and bounds of inherent tribal sovereignty, a court 
might be asked to determine the scope of Congress’s plenary power: Does it 
allow Congress, in the Indian law context, to deny non-Indian U.S. citizens 
the federal constitutional rights they would otherwise receive in a state or 
federal prosecution? 163  Indeed, this question was one mentioned and 
avoided by the Lara Court, which chose not to address “potential 
constitutional limits on congressional efforts to legislate far more radical 
changes in tribal status.”164 
The sources and scope of Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs 
are myriad and complex,165 and giving them a thorough treatment in the 
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction context is beyond the scope 
of this Comment. Can Congress deny non-Indian defendants their rights to 
an Article III judge appointed pursuant to Article II of the U.S. 
Constitution?166 Can Congress refuse non-Indian defendants the grand jury 
indictments and other constitutional rights they would receive in a federal 
prosecution?167 If a court relies on congressional plenary power to uphold 
tribes’ inherent authority to exercise special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction, then these lurking constitutional questions could rise to the 
surface.168 
 
162 See generally Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567-68 (1903) (declaring congressional 
action “conclusive upon the courts” when it concerns Indian affairs); supra note 155 and 
accompanying text. 
163 For domestic violence crimes committed on Indian country in the absence of special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indian defendants rests with 
the state and with the federal government. See generally supra notes 4–8 (describing the 
jurisdictional framework in Indian country). States need not provide defendants with all their 
federal constitutional rights, but they must provide defendants with certain rights—like Miranda 
rights—that tribes are not required to provide. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
164 Lara, 541 U.S. at 205. 
165 See generally Newton, supra note 147 (providing an extensive treatment of the issue). 
166 See supra notes 14, 111–17 and accompanying text (discussing these concerns). 
167 See supra notes 99–117 and accompanying text (discussing the possible differences between 
a tribal prosecution and a federal prosecution). 
168 One might answer these constitutional questions with the position that tribes must offer 
defendants at least as many protections as they would receive in a state prosecution. E-mail from 
Troy Eid, Chairman, Indian Law & Order Comm’n, to author (Sept. 5, 2015) (on file with 
author). For instance, the Indian Law and Order Commission, appointed to study these issues by 
the Tribal Law and Order Act, has taken the view that tribes should “ensure that defendants’ 
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Thus, a tricky analysis lies ahead for a court adjudicating special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction’s constitutionality, even if it relies 
on congressional plenary power in the first instance to justify tribes’ 
inherent authority to exercise special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction. Either (1) the court relies on plenary power and should 
consider the permissible scope of that power, or (2) the court must follow 
the template created by Lara and analyze myriad possible authorities on 
inherent tribal sovereignty 169  to determine whether special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction qualifies as an exercise of that inherent tribal 
sovereignty.170 
V. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF POSSIBLE SUPREME COURT 
HOLDINGS 
If in the future the Supreme Court rules on whether special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction flows from inherent tribal sovereignty, 171 
VAWA 2013’s current jurisdictional framework could be dismantled, 
upheld, or perhaps subjected to a tribe-by-tribe analysis. And even if the 
Supreme Court decides the issues from the congressional plenary power 
perspective,172 similar outcomes are possible. 
If the Court were to rule that no inherent tribal sovereignty exists to 
prosecute non-Indians, then, as noted above, savvy litigants could potentially 
engineer the dismantling of the entire jurisdictional framework as enacted, 
by arguing that tribes’ delegated federal authority violates structural 
guarantees in the federal Constitution.173 Despite VAWA’s constitutional 
“catch-all” provision, valiant tribes’ efforts to enforce the full panoply of 
 
Federal constitutional rights are fully protected” but “retain retain full and final authority over the 
definition of the crime [and] sentencing options.” INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A 
ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA SAFE: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT & 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 24 (Nov. 2013), http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/ 
report/files/A_Roadmap_For_Making_Native_America_Safer-Full.pdf [http://perma.cc/F863-
WLNV]; E-mail from Troy Eid, supra (interpreting the roadmap as taking the position that “all 
U[.]S[.] citizens, Indian and non-Indian alike, must have their federal constitutional rights 
protected by tribal courts at an equivalent level to what states provide”). See generally INDIAN L. 
& ORD. COMMISSION, http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/index.html [http://perma.cc/96YW-
HQ89] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (providing background about the Commission). 
169 See Lara, 541 U.S. at 200-07 (listing and discussing six justifications); supra Sections 
III.B–III.C (listing and discussing multiple arguments for and against inherent tribal authority to 
exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction). 
170 See supra Section III.A for an explanation of how the scope of inherent tribal sovereignty 
affects the constitutionality of special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction. 
171 See supra Part III for possible arguments and reasoning in this vein. 
172 See supra Part IV for considerations surrounding this alternative analytical route. 
173 See supra notes 111–117 and accompanying text. 
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federal constitutional rights, and careful federal–tribal prosecutorial 
cooperation, tribes (and the federal government) are unlikely to find a way 
to address all the constitutional concerns in a way that allows the current 
jurisdictional framework to continue as envisioned by Congress.174 
From the congressional plenary power perspective, the Supreme Court 
might hold that Congress’s plenary power does not include the power to 
deny non-Indian defendants their Article II and Article III rights. Because 
tribes would not be able to provide these rights to non-Indian defendants,175 
the jurisdictional framework envisioned by VAWA 2013 would be similarly 
dismantled. 
If the Court were to hold that tribes do have inherent authority to 
prosecute non-Indians, then special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction 
would be permissible using the structure envisioned by Congress. The “dual 
sovereignty” doctrine would quash defendants’ double jeopardy 
arguments. 176  Other federal constitutional issues would not present 
problems, so long as tribes are careful to provide defendants with statutory 
rights required under ICRA and VAWA 2013, as well as any rights courts 
may find necessary under VAWA 2013’s constitutional “catch-all” 
provision.177 Similarly, Article II and Article III concerns would not hold 
water, because Article II’s appointment provisions apply only to “officers of 
the United States,” 178  and Article III’s life tenure and compensation 
provisions apply only to judges vested with “the judicial power of the 
United States.” 179  Tribal judges exercising inherent tribal authority to 
adjudicate would not be federal officers and would not be vested with 
federal judicial power. Article II appointment and Article III life tenure and 
compensation would not constrain their authority. 
The Court could also reach this result from the congressional plenary 
power perspective. If the Court were to uphold the unlimited scope of 
Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs,180 non-Indian defendants’ loss 
of federal constitutional rights would not pose a concern—in Indian country, 
Congress’s word trumps all. Special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, 
 
174 See id. 
175 See id. 
176 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
177 See supra Section III.A. 
178 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
179 Id. art. III, § 1.. 
180 See generally Section IV.A (providing background on the plenary power doctrine). 
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as envisioned by Congress, could continue unabated—so long as it has 
Congress’s imprimatur.181 
One other possible approach the Court could take is a tribe-by-tribe 
approach, where the source of each tribe’s special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction—be it inherent tribal sovereignty, delegated federal authority, 
or Congress’s plenary power—depends on fact-based determinations. For 
example, the Court might hold that a given tribe has inherent special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians if and only if the 
tribe in question has a compelling historical argument for criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians. Each tribe might be required to justify its assertion of 
inherent sovereignty by reference to historical treaties, historical tribal 
practice, and the like. The Court has taken a similar tribe-by-tribe approach 
in its cases on whether surplus land acts have diminished Indian 
reservations: some surplus land acts diminish Indian reservations and others 
do not, depending on “the language of the act and the circumstances 
surrounding its passage.”182 But though a tribe-by-tribe approach may be 
more equitable in some respects,183 it would further complicate an already 
complicated jurisdictional framework. Because of the allotment policies of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, federal, state, and tribal 
law enforcement authorities sometimes share jurisdiction over 
“checkerboard” lands where enforcement jurisdiction varies by the 
individual land parcel.184 And, given that Congress has only opened special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction to those tribes who can afford to 
provide defendants with the rights guaranteed by VAWA 2013,185 Congress 
itself has created a tribe-specific means of allowing and disallowing tribal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. Adding another layer of complexity would 
 
181 Of course, what Congress gives, Congress can take away. Even if tribes have inherent 
authority to prosecute and punish non-Indians, Congress can impose restrictions on that inherent 
authority just as easily as it can relax restrictions. Cf. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 
(2004) (concluding that Congress may “relax restrictions” on tribal authority, but after noting that 
“the political branches have, over time, placed [those restrictions] on the exercise of a tribe’s 
inherent legal authority”). 
182 Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 469 (1984); see also id. at 469-70 n.10 (discussing examples). 
183 See generally Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 
1114 (2004) (warning against “the pitfalls of making sweeping claims” about Indian tribes, because 
“meaningful variations across the Indian tribes make for varying degrees of federal [and tribal] 
power”). 
184 See generally CAROLE E. GOLDBERG ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE 
NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 24-30 (6th ed. 2010) (describing allotment policies and 
providing an illustrative map of the checkerboard land ownership that resulted on the Lac Courte 
Oreilles Reservation in Wisconsin). These jurisdictional complexities deter effective law 
enforcement. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 8, at 27-39. 
185 See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
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likely do more harm than good, so it seems unlikely that the Court will 
adopt this approach. 
CONCLUSION: FROM WHAT DOES INHERENT TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
DERIVE? 
Oliphant derived the lack of inherent tribal sovereignty to prosecute 
non-Indians from its conception of history and of Indian tribes’ dependent 
status.186 Duro derived the lack of inherent tribal sovereignty to prosecute 
nonmember Indians from the notion that tribe members give voluntary 
consent to tribal jurisdiction.187 And Lara derived its finding of inherent 
tribal sovereignty to prosecute nonmember Indians from congressional 
intent and the notion that Congress can relax federally imposed restrictions 
on inherent tribal sovereignty.188 From what will the VAWA 2013 test case 
derive inherent tribal sovereignty—or the lack thereof? 
This Comment has highlighted a number of considerations, any of 
which could be used by the courts to justify or refute inherent tribal 
authority to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction under 
VAWA 2013. Depending on a given court’s preferred justifications—
history, congressional power, voluntary political membership, etc.—it can 
reasonably rule either for or against inherent tribal authority to exercise 
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction. For non-Indian defendants, 
the scope of their federal constitutional rights is at stake. For the tribes, 
what it means to be sovereign. 
The tribes, however, might have more at stake than just their authority 
to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction. A decision on 
their inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians will affect not just 
their jurisdiction under VAWA 2013, but also any future statutory grants of 
jurisdiction to criminally prosecute non-Indians. Indeed, some tribal 
advocates see special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction as a stepping 
stone to complete tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian offenders for 
crimes committed in Indian country—a complete Oliphant override. 189 
Depending on how courts rule, VAWA 2013’s special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction could be the dead end for these hopes—or it could be 
the beginning of a new era, in which tribes enjoy a breadth of criminal 
 
186 See supra Section I.B. 
187 See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
188 See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
189 See Laird, supra note 12 (“[M]any Indian legal observers see Section 904 [of VAWA 2013] 
as a major step toward safer reservations, and, perhaps, full tribal criminal jurisdiction.”). 
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jurisdiction unprecedented since, perhaps, before the founding of the 
United States. 
